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In this paper we stress the role that decision making, and therefore an
underlying binary (bipolar) approach, plays in Atanassov’s intuition-
istic view of fuzzy sets. Moreover, we point out that such a bipolar
view can be found in classical multicriteria models,
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1 Introduction
Atanassov’s intuitionistic fuzzy sets [3] (see also [4, 5, 6, 11, 31]) has re-
ceived great attention from the scientific community, showing its practical
efficiency when applied to quite a number of problems. Although such
a model has been also subject to a serious controversy because of the im-
proper intuitionistic term and because of its equivalence to already existing
models (see [32] and [13, 15], but also [7, 8]), we think with [20] that there
are certain specific differences in conception that, when included in the
model, can explain such a confusing situation. In particular, in [20] it is
shown how those equivalent models become different when the underlying
structured is taken into account within a classification framework (see [28]
but also [1, 2]). It is also interesting to have a look to [12], where several
formal generalizations of fuzzy sets [34] are reviewed together with some
applications, as alternative models to be tried in those places Atanassov’s
model has been successful, or not successful. The conflict about the name
remains, and some researchers propose to talk about bipolar fuzzy sets in-
stead of Atanassov’s intuitionistic fuzzy sets (see, e.g., [10, 15, 16, 35]).
Atanassov’s model [3] was originally defined as a particular type-2 fuzzy
set (see [14, 17, 18]) µ : X → [0, 1]3 whereX represents the family of objects
under consideration, and the images represents the degrees of membership,
non-membership and indeterminacy for each object x ∈ X. According to
Atanassov’s initial proposal (but see [20]), these three values should sum
up to 1, for all x ∈ X. A binary or bipolar argument is clear from that
membership and non-membership (see also [20]).
Next section 2 will be devoted to explain how keeping decision mak-
ing as the final objective of mathematical modeling may suggest a wrong
methodology in such a modeling process, suggesting that this criticism may
apply to Atanassov’s proposal, too. Section 3 of this paper will be devoted
to analyze some implications in multicriteria decision making, pointing out
the potential interest of alternative models to Atanassov’s approach in deci-
sion making processes. Section 4 will be devoted to illustrate this particular
issue with an example, in order to show the different stages of a decision
process such an evaluation models can impact. A final section 5 will connect
the previous discussion into a more general setting in Science.
2 Bipolarity and decision making
Sometimes it has been argued that nothing can be said about, for example,
tallness without referring to shortness. But notice that shortness is not the
negation of tallness, but is antonym (see, e.g., [33]). As pointed out in [20],
this should be the framework in Atanassov’s model if a classification view
is kept (see also [2]).
The main argument in [21] was that final decision is sometimes mis-
leading decision making researchers, and that certain granted status quo
use to introduce a hidden binary contamination of the proposed mathe-
matical model. Such a contamination comes mainly because of the basic
information, the data, or because of the objective. Although we think with
[27, 29] that the true objective of a mathematical model should be to help
decision maker to understand reality and design new approaches to the
problem (decision making aiding), it is true that a relevant number of re-
searchers have been stressing in the past that the main objective of the
mathematical effort should be instead to support the final decision, not the
decision process itself. These researchers will claim that those final deci-
sion are the only observable data (we shall address the data issue in the
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next section). Although we think that mathematical models should stay
at a decision aid stage, never telling decision maker what decision maker
should do, at this point what we simply want to stress that once we assume
that the final (observable) decision is our objective, such an observability
argument introduces a confusion between the inner decision we make and
the act produced by such a decision (see [22] for a deeper discussion on this
issue). It is also interesting to remind that Medicine has proved that the
part of the human brain in charge of final decision is different from the part
of the brain in charge of its rational analysis [9].
In fact, each act we make is always crisp, although its description is
sometimes fuzzy (mainly because they use to be explained in terms of
words). So, if we focus our study on acts (not their description but the
acts themselves), our study may deal only with crisp information, and the
temptation is clear: classify them in terms of crisp subsets. Of course, each
one of these crisp subsets can be alternatively described in terms of its
complementary. But it must be noticed that, in this crisp context, a subset
and its complementary have exactly the same information. One can be
deduced from the other, and no additional information is gained when the
complementary is given. The useful information (in case a bipolar scheme
is pursued) should be by means of the antonym concept. In some way,
when the universe of potential acts is considered and an experiment is run,
such a universe of potential acts is naturally divided into those acts that
happened and those acts that did not happen. Such a bipolar approach in
terms of a concept and its complementary may be natural within a crisp
context, but it is not informative.
It is interesting to note that in some particular cases, precisely for those
truly crisp concepts, perception of the antonym and perception of the com-
plementary are the same (see [25]).
A bipolar classification in terms of a concept and its antonym can be
nevertheless informative within a fuzzy context. But it does not seem so
natural within a fuzzy context. Talking about height, for example, in no
way restricts our mind into only two classes like tallness and shortness:
there are many alternative fuzzy concepts related to height.
Notice that the same argument applies to facts (again, not to their
description but the facts themselves). Fuzziness in an experiment or ob-
servation appears when those acts or facts need to be described in linguis-
tic terms, which is the standard vehicle for communication among people
(sometimes the information we exchange is crisp, of course).
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3 Bipolarity in multicriteria decision making
In this section we shall show how this intuitionistic or bipolar argument
has been present is classical multicriteria decision making models (such a
polarity may be considered unnatural in a decision making aid approach).
A number of multicriteria decision making tools are based upon the
binary direct comparison between every possible pair of alternatives. Given
a finite family of crisp alternatives X, a fuzzy weak preference relation is
a mapping µ : X × X → [0, 1] that assigns to each pair of alternatives
(x, y) ∈ X ×X a value µ(x, y) the degree to which alternative x is better
or equivalent to y.
The classical ELECTRE model [27], for example, assumes basic data
in terms of a family of fuzzy preference relations for each criteria. Being
C a finite family of criteria describing the main features of each alternative
x ∈ X, for each criteria i ∈ C it is assumed in [27] (see also [30, 26]) the
existence of a fuzzy preference relation
µi : X ×X → [0, 1]
such that µi(x, y) represents the degree of intensity to which alternative
x in weakly better than alternative y whenever we restrict comparison to
criteria i. Based on such an information about the decision maker prefer-
ences decomposed by criteria, an outranking relation [27] is defined over the
cartesian product of all alternatives. And together with such an outranking
relation, it is also defined a veto fuzzy set, in such a way that from both
intensities a fuzzy set of non-dominated alternatives is defined. This fuzzy
set should hopefully point out one solution or a small set of solutions.
Note that the meaning of such an outranking relation seems to be close in
meaning to a strict preference of each alternative x over each alternative y,
and that veto meaning seems to be related to the opposite strict preference.
But in no way outranking is the negation of veto.
The point we want to stress is that such a model [27] acknowledges the
interest of introducing dual concepts in order to analyze how good a solution
is. It is not simply the strict preference of x over y in opposition to the strict
preference of alternative y over x, but how an alternative x is supported
in opposition to the intensity to which an alternative is unacceptable. We
can not make a decision without taking into account pro arguments and
contra arguments at the same time. A contra argument is not simply the
logical negation of a pro argument. In this sense, see an interesting bipolar
approach to Roy’s concordance and discordance in [24].
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4 About the knowledge process
In this section we shall illustrate with an example the different stages of a
knowledge process, each one subject in principle to a crisp, fuzzy, bipolar or
even a more general information support. If Atanassov’s bipolar model has
been successful at any stage of a decision making process, any alternative
extension of fuzzy sets (see, e.g., [12, 20]) are good candidates to improve
those results, introducing a more accurate representation of each possible
description or valuation.
Imagine for example that your kid is sick in bed, and that he ask for a
bottle filled with warm water for his cold feet. We more or less will proceed
following the following stages:
1. Design an observational system for reality, if there is an alternative
to the existing one (perhaps a controlled experiment), in order to
get data (reality is never what we observe, in the same way that
what we see is not the reality itself but the processed information
obtained from our eyes). In our case we may decide to fill up a
bottle in our kitchen, mixing water from the cold tab water at 10
Celsius degrees and the hot tab water at 70 Celsius degrees. This
observational system (by means of those two particular tabs) implies
a binary perception of reality. But no one outside this observational
system will claim that water can be only obtained by means of those
two tabs in our kitchen, and no one outside the previous observational
system thinks that cold means 10 Celsius degrees or that not cold
means 70 Celsius degrees.
2. Design an informational system that will allow us to manipulate data
according to a certain logic (to be chosen) and process those data
into information (in the same way as our brain builds up a continu-
ous perception from a finite family of images obtained from our eyes).
Such an informational system includes knowledge about the mechan-
ical behavior of both tabs and the physical laws ruling the mixture of
liquids. Of course this informational system is being limited by the
previous observational system (we know for example that we shall
never be able to obtain mixed water outside the range 10-70 Celsius
degrees).
3. Design an analytic tool in order to process the previous information,
understand the specific characteristics of our problem and be able
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to make inferences (in our case, we need to measure temperature, of
course, but we should also evaluate the specific characteristic of the
bottle, how sick is the kid and even the personality of the kid, for
example).
4. Design a decision tool which allows to establish goodness criteria or
comparison between different actions (taking into account, for exam-
ple, that too hot water is dangerous and too cold water is disgusting).
Consistency use to be a key requirement at this stage.
5. Design a decision generator, that will generate a final decision accord-
ingly to the previous decision analysis, perhaps taking into account
our own intuition and any other available information or external ad-
vise. For example, we may decide to fill up the bottle half with cold
water and half of hot water, so final temperature should be around
40 degrees (generation of an act may require a random component).
But this decision stage should not be confused with the previous sup-
porting stage, neither the initial global analysis, and neither to the
next stage with the execution of such a final decision into an action.
This stage can include the creation of new alternatives.
6. Execute decision: the particular act, being a consequence of the pre-
vious final decision, depends on the particular size and shape of the
bottles, the mechanical tools we may have at hand to fill up the bottle,
our personal abilities manipulating the bottle and even some contex-
tual or random events (that loud heavy rock loved by our sick kid can
reduce our personal abilities, for example).
7. Design an evaluation tool in order to check results accordingly to final
objectives (including health of the kid, of course, but perhaps kid’s
opinion, too) and decide about a revision of the whole process.
It may happen, like most probably in the above example, that each stage
has been previously assumed by the decision maker because of tradition. It
is then important to realize that such a priori assumptions may represent a
serious problem in more complex problems, when the decision maker is not
conscious of key assumption, like for example the binary conception of the
observational analysis or the binary logic ruling the informational system,
as pointed out in [19].
In general, we can say that data are obtained from reality by means of
a observational system. Data are processed by means of a logic in order to
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produce information and allow inferences. Information should be globally
analyzed by means of several tools (decomposition, aggregation, graphical
representation, etc.) Information suffers a second analysis focussed on de-
cision (such analysis depends on the type of decision we are looking for,
meanwhile the previous information analysis pursues a better knowledge
of the system under study). Then a decision can be made (outside any
previous analytic tool), and depending on the circumstances, an act is pro-
duced, hopefully being consistent with such a decision (the final act it is
not the decision itself: first, such an act is rarely fully described when de-
cision is made and details are left to the very last moment, and second, its
execution may depend on a random or uncontrolled context). Still, such
an act and its consequences need to be described and evaluated according
the previously defined objective.
But of course the declared objective does not affect only to the eval-
uation stage. The whole process is obviously under the influence of such
an objective. For example, the data produced by the observational system
should be consistent with the informational system that will manipulate
those data (the observational system of course introduces a clear restric-
tion on the informational system, but the logic ruling the informational
system introduces also restrictions on the design of the observational sys-
tem). Analogously, the creation of a new alternative may imply to go
back one stage, and a surprising result in the evaluation stage can make
us return to re-design the informational system or even the observational
system. The above knowledge stages are not independent, and the process
itself is neither unidirectional.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have pointed out a possible double contamination of the
original Atanassov’s model, coming from a natural binary crisp approach
to decision making: on the one hand, because of the description in terms of
two concepts; and on the other hand, because of the confusion between com-
plementary and antonym (which makes Atanassov’s indeterminacy perhaps
meaningless). A first consequence on multicriteria analysis is considered,
suggesting a systematic application of alternative extensions of fuzzy sets
to those problems where a bipolar approach has been successful or failed.
Moreover, an example is presented in order to get a better understanding
of the different stages within the knowledge process where those alterna-
tive extensions should be tried. In particular, we want to stress again that
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classical experiments use to assume in fact an observational system that
implies a crisp logic, which may remain hidden to many scientists if they
are not conscious of such an traditional assumption (see again [19]).
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